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ABSTRACT

Information Asymmetry, Agency Cost and Stock Liquidity:
Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

by
YUAN Tao
Master of Philosophy

The coexistence of tradable and non-tradable shares in Chinese firms has caused
severe agency problems and has been the subject of much criticism. In 2005, the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission launched a reform to eliminate the
dual-class share structure and convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares. My
thesis examines how the Split Share Structure Reform in China affects the level of
information asymmetry of listed firms. The regression results show that the
firm-level information asymmetry, measured by the probability of informed trading
(PIN), is positively associated to the firm’s proportion of non-tradable shares before
the reform, and the PIN decreases significantly after the reform. This is so because
the reform reduces the agency costs of firms and increases stock market liquidity. I
further document that the reform’s effects on PIN are more pronounced for the firms
whose non-tradable shares are more likely to be traded after the reform, the firms that
experience a significant enhancement in blockholders’ threat to exit and non-SOEs.
The liquidity shock induced by the reform also increases the intensities of informed
trading and uninformed trading in the market and the magnitudes of the influences
are larger for the latter than the former. My thesis sheds light on the consequences of
the reform of firm ownership structure in China and shows that reducing information
asymmetry is a channel through which the reform helps improve firm performance.
The results of my study provide policy implications for future reforms in developing
financial markets.
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Information asymmetry, agency cost and stock liquidity:
Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

Chapter 1. Introduction

My thesis examines the influence of the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in
China on the level of information asymmetry of listed firms. The co-existence of
tradable and non-tradable shares in a firm in China before 2005 has been criticized as
the source of many problems in corporate governance (Chen et al. (2012), Liao et al.
(2014), Campello et al. (2015)). In April 2005, the Chinese Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) initiated the SSSR programme that mandated all listed firms to
convert their non-tradable shares to tradable shares. In my thesis, the most important
findings are that a firm’s information asymmetry declines significantly after the
SSSR and the reduction in agency cost and improvement in stock liquidity serve as
two channels through which the reform affects information asymmetry.

Before the SSSR in 2005, shares of listed companies in China were divided into
non-tradable shares and tradable shares. Tradable shares were issued to private or
institutional investors and could be transacted freely in the secondary market. In
contrast, non-tradable shares, typically held by the state or legal persons, were only
allowed to be traded through negotiations between designated parties under
authorities' approval. At the end of 2004, non-tradable shares accounted for about 60%
of total outstanding shares. As non-tradable shareholders could not realize gains or
obtain cashes by selling their shares in organized stock exchanges, they have limited
incentives to be concerned with share prices. Therefore, there is a significant
divergence between the interests of non-tradable shareholders and those of tradable
1

shareholders (Allen et al. (2005)).

One important group of non-tradable shareholders in listed firms are the large and
controlling shareholders. Public firms in China are characterized by highly
concentrated ownership structures with dominating controlling shareholders (La
Porta et al. (2010)). Under the split share structure, the interests between the
controlling shareholders holding non-tradable shares and minority shareholders
investing in tradable shares were further separated because the share pricing
mechanisms are different. As the controlling shareholders are not allowed to buy or
sell their shares freely in the market, their wealth is not directly related with the
market stock price. Controlling shareholders thus have limited incentives to monitor
managers to increase share price but are incentivized to expropriate minority
shareholders aggressively for private benefits of control (Jensen et al. (1979)). For
example, Liao et al. (2013) documents that before the reform, 29.7% of listed firms
engage in related-party transactions and 42.3% make intercorporate loans to their
controlling shareholders.

The non-tradable shareholders also include other blockholders who cannot influence
firms’ management decisions directly. According to the blockholders’ exit threat
theory developed by Edmans (2009), blockholders who hold more than 5% of the
firm’s shares and have no management representation can exert governance on
management through threatening to exit (i.e. to sell their shares). Prior literature has
shown that in the U.S., blockholders’ selling their shares sends a negative signal to
the market and can lead to stock price decline. In order to prevent these blockholders
from selling their shares, managers tend to align their interest with shareholders to
2

improve firm performance and enhance corporate governance, especially when the
wealth of controlling shareholders and managers are closely tied with stock market
price. Therefore, the threat to exit exerted by non-managerial blockholders is
considered as an important monitoring mechanism. Before the reform, however, such
a threat through exit is very limited because most non-managerial blockholders held
non-tradable shares in China.1

Therefore, the strong entrenchment effects of controlling shareholder and limited
monitoring abilities of non-managerial blockholders caused by the split share
structure induce poor corporate governance and incredible information disclosures in
Chinese listed firms. The SSSR, which eliminates the split share structure, is
expected to reduce a firm’s information asymmetry through aligning the interests
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and enhancing the
monitoring effects of non-managerial blockholders2. Extant studies have already
demonstrated that better corporate governance helps reduce a firm's information
asymmetry. For instance, Fan and Wong (2002) examine the relation between
earnings informativeness and ownership structure and they argue that controlling
shareholders may report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing
the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Leuz et al. (2003) find
that the independence of the audit committee can improve the quality of financial
statements and suggest that better governance may improve financial transparency by
mitigating management's ability and incentive to distort information disclosures.

1

Before the reform, low stock liquidity also limits the ability of non-managerial blockholders to exert
influences through exit threat.
2
Our study mainly focuses on the enhancement of the monitoring effect of the exit-threat channel
induced by the reform, but we do not reject the potential that the monitoring effect of the traditional
voice channel may also be stronger after the reform.
3

Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) show that higher board quality is associated with
lower firm's information asymmetry, which is measured by the error in management
earnings forecasts. Chung et al. (2010) find that the quality of corporate governance
measured by information-related governance indexes is negatively related with firm's
information asymmetry, which is measured by the probability of informed trading
(PIN). They argue that more effective governance can improve financial and
operational transparency, which result in a decline in information asymmetry
between insiders and outsider investors. Therefore, I conjecture that the SSSR
reduces firm’s information asymmetry by lowering agency costs.

Another channel, through which the SSSR affects information asymmetry, is the
stock market liquidity. The non-tradable shareholders can trade their shares freely in
the secondary market after the reform. About two thirds of the firms’ total shares
outstanding will flow into the market gradually and poses a large and positive shock
to stock liquidity. Campello et al. (2014) document that stock liquidity measured by
liquidity ratio increases significantly after the SSSR. According to Easley et al.
(1996), higher stock liquidity is associated with lower information asymmetry.
Therefore, I expect that the increment in stock liquidity induced by the completion of
the SSSR serves as another channel that leads to a decline in firm's information
asymmetry3.

Using a panel data from 2002 to 2011 and difference-in-difference regression model,

3

Kelly and Ljungqist (2012) show that higher information asymmetry can reduce stock liquidity. The
endogenous issue of the relationship between stock liquidity and information asymmetry is not critical
in our setting since the influence of the reform on stock liquidity is much more straightforward than
on information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. It is so because share supply increases
after the reform. We follow prior literature to regard the reform as an exogenous liquidity shock
4

I show that the information asymmetry of listed firms in China, measured by the
probability of informed trading (PIN), declines significantly after the Split Share
Structure Reform. I also find that the SSSR causes lower agency cost and higher
stock liquidity.

Considering that the existence of non-tradable shares is the source of high agency
conflicts and low stock liquidity, I perform regression analysis and show that before
the reform, the level of PIN is significantly and positively related to the proportion of
non-tradable shares. I also test how the trading potential of the previous non-tradable
shares can affect the influence of the reform. Intuitively, the reform’s effect on PIN
will be limited if the previous non-tradable shareholders are expected to maintain,
instead of reducing, their shareholdings after the reform. The non-tradable
shareholders who have the lowest potential to trade their shares frequently are the
Chinese government. In contrast, legal persons have high incentives to sell their
shares after the reform for risk-diversification benefits. I regard non-tradable shares
held by the state as with low trading potential while those held by legal persons as
with high trading potential. I find that PIN declines more for firms with more
non-tradable shares held by legal persons and declines less for those with more
non-tradable shares held by the state.

Further, I examine how the blockholders’ exit threat can affect the influence of the
reform. I show that firms with at least one non-managerial blockholder in 2004
experience a larger decline in PIN after the reform, than those without
non-managerial blockholders. The results are consistent with Edman's (2009) theory
that blockholders can monitor managers through threatening to exit. I also examine
5

how the influences differ between SOEs and non-SOEs. On one hand, the fraction of
non-tradable shares in SOEs are much higher than that in non-SOEs and intuitively
the effect of the reform on SOEs should be stronger. That is, the reduction in
information asymmetry should be higher for SOEs. On the other hand, however,
since the ultimate controlling shareholders of SOEs are the state agencies, the trading
potential of the previous non-tradable shares in SOEs is relatively lower than
non-SOEs. Moreover, , the exit threat of blockholders in SOEs is less effective as a
monitoring mechanism because the wealth of managers in SOEs is less tied with
stock price (Chen et al. (2013)). Because of the distinction in trading potential and
effectiveness of blockholders’ exit threat, the impacts of the reform on SOEs may be
less pronounced relative to non-SOEs. With regard to the two competing rationale
above, our empirical results that the reduction in PIN is lower for SOEs suggest that
the latter one dominates the former. Further, to alleviate the concern that the reform
increases inside trading (trading performed by the previous non-tradable shareholders
who have inside information), I continue to check how the reform affects the trading
behaviors of informed traders and uninformed traders. I decompose PIN into
informed trading and uninformed trading following Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and
Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013) and find that the exogenous shock on liquidity
induced by the SSSR leads to an increase in the intensities of both informed trading
and uninformed trading. The magnitude of the influences on uninformed trading
intensity is much larger than informed trading intensity. My results are consistent
with Easley et al. (1996) that uninformed traders value liquidity that can reduce the
risk of trading with informed traders.

Finally, I conduct a battery of robustness tests. First, the OLS regressions assume that
6

the dependent variable and the regressors are linearly related. I adopt the propensity
score matching method to relax the linearity constraint and check the
difference-in-difference estimates again. Using different matching strategies the
average treatment effects of treatment group are significantly and persistently
negative. I also replicate my benchmark regression by replacing PIN with the errors
of analysts’ earnings forecasts as an alternative measure of information asymmetry.
Same as for PIN, the analyst forecast error also decreases significantly after the
reform. To estimate the impact of the reform more directly and eliminate the
potential influences of other policy events on PIN, I narrow the window of the
impact of the reform and conduct univariate analysis on the changes of quarterly PIN
closely around the reform. The results show that PIN declines significantly in all the
four quarters around the reform. Finally, I show that the decline in PIN after the
reform is not driven by any pre-existing downward time trend prior to the reform by
re-estimating my baseline regression with a placebo test.

To the best of my knowledge my study is the first to directly examine how the Split
Share Structure Reform in China influences information asymmetry of firms. Since
information asymmetry is an important factor affecting a firm’s cost of capital, by
documenting a decline in firm's information asymmetry this study can shed light on
how the Split Share Structure Reform influences firm performance and provide
policy implications for further privatization of developing markets. Several previous
studies also test how the Split Share Structure Reform can affect a firm’s information
environment. For example, Hou et al. (2012) show that the reform causes an increase
in the stock price informativeness and Kuo et al. (2014) and Xiao (2015) find that the
earnings management increases significantly after the reform. My study is distinct
7

from them by using a market-based measure of information asymmetry and by
identifying the channels through which the reform affects a firm’s information
asymmetry. Furthermore, regression results in my study show how the potential for
trading and blockholders’ exit threat help to understand the influences of reform,
while previous studies fail to do so.

Second, my thesis contributes to the literature on the relations between corporate
governance, stock liquidity and information asymmetry. My results lend support to
the prior literature by showing that the reduction of agency cost and improvement in
stock liquidity are the channels through which the reform reduces firm's information
asymmetry. Moreover, as indicated by Beyer et al. (2010), a significant challenge
confronted by the empirical tests on the association between corporate governance
and information environment arises from the issue of endogeneity. It is difficult to
establish causal links and identify the causal effect that one mechanism might lead to
another and thus Beyer et al. (2010) calls for exogenous shock settings. My study
caters their appeal and addresses the endogeneity issue by adopting the Split Share
Structure Reform in China as an exogenous shock on agency problems4.

Third, I extend the theory on blockholders’ exit threat of Edmans (2009) to its effects
on firm's information asymmetry. My findings provide support to Edmans (2009) by
showing that blockholders can help improve firm’s transparency through threatening
to exit after the reform. Moreover, my results indicate that blockholders’ exit threat is

4

Since the announcement of the start of the reform must be approved by the CSRC and the
completion of the reform can only be achieved under the agreement between non-tradable
shareholders and tradable shareholders through the voting process. There leaves not much room for a
firm to time the start date and completion date of the reform. Thus, following prior literature, I regard
the reform as a quasi-natural experiment.
8

effective in a developing country.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background of
the Split Share Structure Reform in China and reviews related literature. I develop
my hypothesis in section 3. Section 4 introduces the data of my study and variable
constructions, including descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides my research design
and main regression results. Section 6 includes more analysis related to the factors
that influence the reform’s effects on information asymmetry. Robustness tests are
provided in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.

Chapter 2. Institutional background and literature review

2.1 Institutional background
Before 2005, a split share structure prevailed among all the listed firms in the
domestic A-share market in China. Under the dual-class share structure, the tradable
shares are issued to private or institutional investors and could be transacted freely in
the secondary market. In contrast, the non-tradable shareholders, who are typically
the government or the founders, are not allowed to trade their shares in organized
stock exchanges. 5 There is a divergence in the interests between non-tradable
shareholders and tradable shareholders because the wealth of the former is not
directly tied with the market prices. Before the end of 2004, about two-thirds of total
shares outstanding of Chinese listed firms are held by non-tradable shareholders. The
split share structure causes many crucial problems in the functioning and
development of the financial markets in China (Allen et al. (2005)), and raises
5

Under special circumstances, non-tradable shareholders may trade their shares. However, they must
obtain the approval from the government and determine the transaction price via negotiations.
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tremendous concerns for the central government.

In April 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRS) initiated the
split share structure reform, which was designed to eliminate the dual share structure
and mandatorily convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares. One major
requirement is that non-tradable shareholders must compensate tradable shareholders,
because through the reform, the former gain opportunities to sell their shares in the
stock markets and achieve diversification, whereas the latter might suffer a loss
arising from the influx of stock supply in the market. After the announcement to start
the reform, the non-tradable shareholders need to negotiate with tradable
shareholders about the compensations in a proposal. The reform cannot be moved
forward until more than two thirds of tradable shareholders voted to agree with the
reform proposal (Li et al. (2011)). The Chinese government exerts political pressures
on listed firms to smoothly complete the reform and required all listed firms to
complete the reform by the end of 2006 (Firth et al. (2010)).

To stabilize the stock market, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
and stock exchanges strictly control the number of firms that could start the reform in
each month.6 Hence, there is not much room for firms to time the start of the reform.
It is also hard for the firms to manage when they can complete the reform, because
the progress of the reform for each firm largely depends on the negotiations between
non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders. By the end of 2007, 97% of
listed firms have successfully finished the reform. Figure 1 shows the annual
distribution of the number (and percentage) of the firms starting the reform in Panel
6

A firm must gain the approval from the stock exchanges before it can announce the start of the
reform.
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A and completing the reform in Panel B. Most firms started and completed the
reform in 2006. I follow Firth et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2012), among others, and
consider the reform as an exogenous shock to corporate governance systems and
stock market liquidity.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The restrictions on the trading of non-tradable shares are removed gradually after the
reform. As regulated by the CSRC, there is a 12-month compulsory lock-up period
during which, the previous non-tradable shares cannot be traded. After the lock-up
period, previous non-tradable shareholders are not allowed to sell more than 5% in
the first 12 months or more than 10% in the second 12 months. After three years, all
the trading restrictions are removed.

2.2 Literature on information asymmetry
There has been a large body of literature on how information asymmetry is related
with the cost of external financing or stock returns (Myers and Majluf (1984), Easley
et al. (2002), Easley et al. (2004), Lambert et al. (2007), and Heitzman et al. (2010)).
However, there is a limited investigation about which firms tend to have high
information asymmetry. Aslan et al. (2011) fill the gap by studying how the firm’s
accounting characteristics in the U.S. are related with the information asymmetry,
measured by the probability of informed trading. They find that firms with smaller
size, fewer analysts following, more insider holdings and smaller institutional
ownership are subject to higher information asymmetry. In my study, I follow Aslan
et al. (2011) to select the control variables and find that, with the data of Chinese
11

listed firms, most of these control variables are significant and with consistent signs
with those in the U.S..

Some literature suggests that better corporate governance can reduce firm’s
information asymmetry.7 Specifically, Bens (2002) documents that the frequency
and accuracy of firms’ voluntary disclosures increase with the monitoring effect of
shareholders. The independence of the audit committee can improve the quality of
firms’ financial statements by reducing abnormal accruals (Klein (2002)). Fang and
Wong (2002) test the relation between earnings informativeness and the ownership
structure and argue that controlling owners are perceived to report accounting
information for self-interest purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose
credibility to outside investors. Based on the data of 31 countries, Leuz et al. (2003)
show that earnings management of firms decreases in investor protection. Ajinkya et
al. (2005) examine the relation between board quality and firm’s information
asymmetry and find that outside directors and institutional ownership can increase
the frequency and accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Chung et al. (2010)
test how internal corporate governance can affect firms’ information asymmetry and
documents a negative relation between information-related governance indexes and
the probability of informed trading.

Stock liquidity can also reduce the information asymmetry among investors. Easley
et al. (1996) find that the probability of informed trading is lower for stocks with
higher trading volumes. They further show that higher stock trading volume are also
associated with higher probability of information event, higher intensity of informed
7

Please refer to Beyer et al. (2010) for a review on the association between corporate governance and
firms’ information environment.
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trading and higher intensity of uninformed trading. However, the effect of stock
liquidity on uninformed trading has a larger magnitude than that on informed trading.
They conclude that liquidity can decrease information asymmetry in the market.

2.3 Literature on the Split Share Structure Reform
Existing literature on the Split Share Structure Reform in China focuses on two
aspects which are the reform’s outcome and the reform’s process. Most literature
examining the outcomes of the reform documents a positive effect on listed firms in
China. For example, Chen et al. (2012) find that the average cash holdings of listed
firms decrease significantly after the reform. There is a larger reduction in cash
holdings for firms with weaker governance and those facing more financial
constraints prior to the reform. Liao et al. (2013) compare the impact of the reform
on SOEs with non-SOEs and show that the reform’s positive effects on firm’ output,
profit and employment are higher for SOEs than for non-SOEs. In contrast, the
operating efficiency and corporate governance improve less for SOEs than non-SOEs
after the reform. A parallel study by Campello et al. (2015) questions whether it is
suitable to consider the reform as a setting for a natural experiment and adopts the
time-varying treatment estimation approach to address the endogeneity issue. Their
study confirms with the other literature by showing that the reform significantly
increases corporate profitability, investment, stock liquidity and the firms’ propensity
to issue new shares and engage in merger deals.

Both Hwang et al. (2006) and Hou et al. (2012) examine the impact of the reform on
the stock market and show that the reform increases share turnover, dampens
speculating trading and increases stock price informativeness. According to Hwang
13

et al. (2006), the positive effects of the reform on stock turnover and speculative
trading are not only evident in A-shares but also on in B-shares markets. Liao et al.
(2011) further documents a prominent abnormal stock return of -14% around the
lockup expirations of the reform and suggests that the mandatory lockup serves as an
information discovery role to signal firms’ quality and could alleviate agency
problems.

Nearly all of these prior literatures suggest that the reform can improve firms’
governance and information disclosures. However, Xiao (2015) suggests a different
view and shows that accruals among Chinese listed firms increase significantly after
the reform. Their study suggests that the trading by large shareholders and insiders
increases earnings manipulations.

The other stream of the literature studies the process of the reform. Firth et al. (2010)
find that mutual fund ownership has a negative effect on the compensation ratio,
especially in state-owned firms. They conclude that state shareholders would exert
political pressure on mutual funds to facilitate the reform process. They also
document a negative link between the abnormal returns in SOEs and mutual funds,
which signals individual investors' disappointment towards the failure of mutual
funds to fight for their interests. Huang and Zhu (2014) find that the participations of
the qualified foreign institutional investors have an opposite impact on the reform’s
process to the domestic mutual funds. It is showed that the firms with QFII
ownership have shorter reform duration and higher compensation ratio to the
minority shareholders. Li et al. (2011) study how the removal of market frictions is
associated with efficiency gains and find that the compensation ratio is positively
14

associated with both the gain in risk sharing and the price impact of more supplies of
the shares induced by the reform. Utilizing high-frequency transaction data of stock
markets, Tong et al. (2013) find that institutional investors trade with inside
information by buying event firms’ shares before their announcement to start the split
share structure reform.
2.4 Literature on the blockholders’ exit threat
There is a small but emerging literature on the exit threat of blockholders. Since exit
threat of blockholders is hard to measure directly and the analysis may be subject to
endogeneity problems, most prior studies adopt exogenous shocks on liquidity as a
quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effects. For example, using the
decimalization of the U.S. stock markets in 2001 as an exogenous shock to liquidity,
Edmans et al. (2013) show that liquidity can reduce blockholders' propensity for
active investment (filing Schedule 13D). They argue that a lower propensity of
activism represents the governance through the exit threat instead of the
abandonment of governance. Positive returns around announcements and
improvements in operating performance following a 13G filing show that the
governance is exerted by non-managerial blockholders through threatening to exit.
Bharath et al. (2013) find that firms with larger block holdings experience smaller
decline in firm value after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and Russian default
crisis in 1998. They also document a significantly greater increase in firm value for
firms with larger block holdings after decimalization of the U.S. stock exchanges in
2001. The effects on firm value are more pronounced for firms whose management's
compensation is more closely tied to the stock price, which distinguishes exit-threat
governance channel from traditional direct intervention of blockholders. Also using
15

Asian financial crisis, Russian default crisis and the U.S. exchanges decimalization,
Dou et al. (2014) extend blockholder exit threat to firm's financial reporting quality.
They show that firms with stronger intensity of blockholder exit threat tend to have
higher financial reporting quality. Unlike previous studies, Hope et al. (2015) adopt
the Split Share Structure Reform setting in China as an exogenous liquidity shock
and find the exit threat of non-managerial blockholders is effective in improve firm
performance in China where private benefits of control are prevalent. My study is
distinct from Hope et al (2015)’s study by examining the effect of blockholders’ exit
threat on the level of firm’s information asymmetry.

16

Chapter 3. Hypothesis development

The SSSR eliminates the dual-class share structure of listed firms, and allows the
previous non-tradable shareholders to trade their shares in the secondary markets.
The controlling shareholders, who are the largest non-tradable shareholders before
the reform, become much more concerned with the stock market prices as they could
benefit from capital gains like minority shareholders. I consider that the reform helps
better align the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Meanwhile, another important group of non-tradable shareholders are the
non-managerial blockholders, who can also “exit” the firms by selling their shares
after the reform. The prior literature suggests that the negative pressures on stock
prices, caused by blockholders’ selling decisions constitute a threat to the controlling
shareholders and managers.8 Therefore, the firms’ management has the incentives to
enhance corporate governance and information disclosure with the objective to
prevent blockholders from selling their shares. The incentive alignment effect and the
blockholders’ exit threat caused by the SSSR could help reduce firms’ information
asymmetry.

The level of information symmetry of firms decreases also because there is a larger
share supply and higher stock liquidity in the secondary market after the reform. A
higher stock liquidity can reduce the probability of informed trading by attracting
more uninformed traders. Therefore, I expect that the reform reduces the level of
information asymmetry of listed firms in China.

8

See, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), Edmans (2014), Edmans
and Manso (2011) among others.
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Hypothesis 1: Information asymmetry in listed firms declines after the Split Share
Structure Reform.

According to the discussions outline above, information asymmetry decreases after
the reform because of lower agency costs and higher stock market liquidity.

Hypothesis 1a: The reduction of the agency costs serves as a channel through
which the reform affects firm’s information asymmetry.

Hypothesis 1b: The improvement in stock market liquidity serves as a channel
through which the reform affects firms’ information asymmetry.

Although the previous non-tradable shareholders are allowed to trade their shares
after the reform, some of them might have the incentives to keep holding their shares.
For example, shares held by the Chinese government are less likely to be actively
traded in the market because the state has high incentives to maintain its control over
some listed firms. Moreover, state shares are normally managed by the central or
local government, or government agencies that tend not to trade their shares actively
or sell their shares aggressively. The reform’s effects are limited if it is expected that
the non-tradable shareholders tend not to trade their shares (Xiao (2015). In contrast,
legal persons who own non-tradable shares previously can trade their shares for
diversification benefits after the reform (Li et al. (2011)). Therefore, I expect that the
reform’ effects are stronger if the firms’ non-tradable shares are more likely to be
traded actively after the reform.
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H2: The reform’s effects to reduce information asymmetry are weaker for firms
with more non-tradable shares held by the state and stronger for firms with more
non-tradable shares held by legal persons.

In addition, the reform reduces information asymmetry because it allows the
non-managerial blockholders who held non-tradable shares previously to exert
influences through threatening to exit (Hope et al. (2015)). The removal of market
friction by the reform further strengthens the monitoring roles played by
blockholders.

Therefore,

firms

with

non-managerial

blockholders

holding

non-tradable shares are expected to experience a greater decline in information
asymmetry after the reform.

H3: The reform’s effects to reduce firms’ information asymmetry are stronger for
firms who experience a significant increase in blockholders’ exit threat.

I also test how the influences of the reform differ between SOEs and non-SOEs. On
one hand, the fraction of non-tradable shares in SOEs are much higher than that in
non-SOEs and intuitively the effect of the reform on SOEs should be stronger. That
is, the reduction in information asymmetry should be higher for SOEs. On the other
hand, however, since the ultimate controlling shareholders of SOEs are the state
agencies, the trading potential of previous non-tradable shares in SOEs is relatively
lower than non-SOEs. Moreover, , the exit threat of blockholders in SOEs is less
effective as a monitoring mechanism because the wealth of managers in SOEs is less
tied with stock price (Chen et al. (2013)). Because of the distinction in trading
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potential and effectiveness of blockholders’ exit threat, the impacts of the reform on
SOEs may be less pronounced relative to non-SOEs. With regard to the two
competing hypothesis above, it seems hard to determine which may dominate the
other. Here, we simple choose the latter rational to form our hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: The reform’s effects to reduce firms’ information asymmetry are
stronger for non-SOEs than SOEs.

I further explore how the reform influences the trading behaviors of informed traders
and uninformed traders. The reform provides an exogenous shock to increase share
supplies in the stock market and thus can cause higher stock liquidity. The trading
intensity of informed traders tends to rise because of lower trading costs.9 The
trading intensity of uninformed traders is also expected to be higher because higher
stock liquidity can reduce the risk of uninformed traders to be confronted with
informed traders. According to Easley et al. (1996), higher stock liquidity tends to
attract more uninformed traders than informed traders.

Hypothesis 5: Both the intensities of informed trading and uninformed trading
increase after the reform and the magnitude in the increase of uninformed-trading
intensity is larger than that of informed-trading intensity.

9

The trading intensity of informed traders increases after the reform also because the non-tradable
shareholders who possess insider information were forbidden from trading before the reform.
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Chapter 4. Data and variables

4.1 Sample
The data on the Split Share Structure Reform including the reform completion dates
of firms are obtained from the CSMAR database. To construct the annual measure of
PIN, I collect the intraday stock trading data from the SINOFIN-CCER database that
provides high-frequency quotation and transaction data of all listed firms on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges starting from 2002. The annual data of
accounting information, industry specifications and daily stock trading prices and
volumes are also from the CSMAR database. My sample period spans from 2002 to
2011. In my sample, 1,338 (97%) out of 1,380 firms completed the Split Share
Structure Reform by the end of 2008. I exclude observations with incomplete
accounting information and firms that are in the financial industry or delisted. To
avoid the possibility that the post-reform results are driven by new initial public
offerings, I require my sample firms to be listed before 2005.

4.2 Measure of information asymmetry
I use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as the measure of information
asymmetry for a firm according to the microstructure model developed by Easley et
al. (1996, 1997a and 1997b). The model posits the existence of a market maker, who
observes the flow of buy and sell orders and assesses the probability that the orders
are submitted by informed traders when offering bid and ask quotes. According to
the setting of the model, a new information event occurs at the beginning of a trading
day with a probability of 𝛼. Conditional on an information event happening on a
particular day, good news happens with a probability of 1 − 𝛿 and bad news
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happens with a probability of 𝛿. Throughout the trading day, trades are assumed to
arrive following Poisson process. Orders from informed traders arrive at a rate of 𝜇.
Informed traders buy if the event is good and otherwise sell. Buy and sell orders
from uninformed traders arrive at the rates of 𝜀𝑏 and 𝜀𝑠 , respectively.

Using the data on the numbers of buy and sell orders for a stock in a day, the
parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function for I
trading days as follows:

𝐼

𝐿(𝜃|𝑀) = ∏ 𝐿(𝜃|𝐵𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 )
𝑖=1

= 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)𝑒 −(𝜇+𝜀𝑏)
(1 − 𝛼)𝑒 −𝜀𝑏

where

𝜀𝑏 𝐵𝑖
𝐵𝑖 !

(𝜇+𝜀𝑏 )𝐵𝑖

𝑒 −𝜀𝑠

𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀𝑠 )

𝐵𝑖 !

𝑒 −𝜀𝑠

𝜀 𝑠 𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑖 !

+𝛼𝛿𝑒 −(𝜇+𝜀𝑠 )

(𝜇+𝜀𝑠 )𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑖 !

𝑒 −𝜀𝑏

𝜀𝑏 𝐵𝑖
𝐵𝑖 !

+

𝜀 𝑠 𝑆𝑖

(1)

𝑆𝑖 !

is

the

unobservable

parameter

set

and

M=

((𝐵1 , 𝑆1 ), … , (𝐵𝐼 , 𝑆𝐼 )) is a set of daily numbers of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated
orders from day 1 to day I. I identify the buyer-initiated and seller-initiated
transactions and calculate (𝐵𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 ) following Lee and Ready (1991).

The probability of informed trading, PIN, is defined as follows:

𝛼×𝜇

𝑃𝐼𝑁 = 𝛼×𝜇+𝜀

𝑏 +𝜀𝑠

𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚

= 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚+𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚

(2)

where 𝛼 × 𝜇 is the intensity of informed trades, and the denominator (𝛼 × 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏 +
𝜀𝑠 ) is the intensity of both informed and uninformed trades. Equation (2) shows that
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the PIN captures the relative trading intensity between informed trades and
uninformed trades.

The PIN ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the percentage arrival rates of informed
trades over all trades. A higher value of PIN indicates a higher level of information
asymmetry. The PIN variable provides a direct measure of the level of information
asymmetry among investors and has been applied in different countries (Brown et al.
(2009), Chan et al. (2008), Firth et al. (2014), Lai et al. (2014))10. An advantages of
adopting PIN as the measure for information asymmetry is that I can examine the
reform’s effects on trading behaviors of informed trading and uninformed trading
separately.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

[Insert Table 1 here]

Figure 2 plots the upper quartile, median and lower quartile of firms’ observations of
PIN from 2002 to 2011. Before 2005, there is no obvious trend of PIN over time
while the medium values of PIN decline in the following years. Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of annual measures of PIN. In Panel A, the statistics of PIN are
overall lower after 2005. The estimates of parameters in Panel B are consistent with
those presented in the prior literature. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the PIN

10

The applications of PIN in China are also presented in several papers. For example, Chen et al.
(2008) find that information asymmetry measured by PIN explains a large proportion of
cross-sectional variation in B-share discount in China. Firth et al. (2012) use PIN as the proxy for
price informativeness in China and find that PIN is associated with higher CEO pay-performance
sensitivity. Lai et al. (2014) adopt PIN as the measure of information risk and find PIN has no pricing
effect on stock returns over the world including China.
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decrease after the reform and provides some preliminary evidence, which is
consistent with my main hypothesis.

4.3 Measure of blockholders’ exit threat
According to the prior literature on blockholders’ exit threat and the setting of my
study, I only consider the blockholders who are non-managerial and hold
non-tradable shares before the reform. Before the reform, non-tradable shareholders
cannot exert threat on firms’ management via selling their shares. The SSSR removes
the restriction and provides a liquidity shock that induces significant changes of the
exit threat of these previous non-tradable blockholders.11 I restrict my sample of
blockholders to those without management representation in firms because managers
would not threaten themselves (Edmans (2009)). To identify the firms (treatment
group) who experienced significant enhancement in exit threat and to minimize my
measurement error, I construct two dummy variables to capture the blockholders’
exit threat that define “non-managerial” in two ways.

The first dummy variable, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 , equals to 1 when firm i has at least on
non-managerial shareholder in 2004 who: 1) holds non-tradable shares; 2) holds
more than 3% 12 of total shares outstanding; and 3) has no management
representation as any directors and executives. The second dummy variable,
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 , equals to 1 when firm i has at least on non-managerial shareholder in
2004 who: 1) holds non-tradable shares; 2) holds more than 3% of total shares

11

The trading behavior of other blockholders such as mutual funds can also be influenced by the
reform because the reform induces higher stock market liquidity. However, the magnitude of the
reform’s effect on mutual funds’ exit threat is smaller than those on non-tradable shareholders.
12
To avoid the problem that the sample size for the treatment group is too small, we choose 3%
instead of 5% as the ownership threshold for blockholder because many shareholders’ stock holdings
are between 3% and 4%.
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outstanding; and 3) has no management representation in key positions of CEOs,
COBs and CFOs. 13 I manually collect the data of managers’ background by
searching the information on managers’ secondary job, the biographies of firms’
managers and the information of firms’ top ten shareholders. It is very often that the
blockholders are companies. If I find that a manager of firm i takes a position in a
blockholder-company that holds more than 3% non-tradable shares of firm i, the
blockholder-company is considered as a managerial blockholder and is not included
in my treatment group. I exclude natural-person blockholders because it is hard to
judge their relationship with the management and their ownership account for a very
small proportion of blockholder’ ownership. For 1,380 listed firms in my sample, I
identify 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 =1 for 408 firms and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 =1 for 635 firms. These firms
are in the treatment group while the remaining is regarded as firms in the control
group.

4.4 Control variables and descriptive statistics
I include a set of time-varying firm-level control variables in my regression model
following Aslan et al. (2011) and Gul et al. (2010): Firm size (𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) is measured as
the logarithm of market capitalization. Larger firms may be more exposed in public
and tend to have lower information asymmetry. The logarithm of the number of
analysts following firm i in year t (𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) captures the role of stock analysts in
shaping firm's information environment. Firms with more analysts following tend to
be more transparent. Institutional investors are thought to play an important role in
monitoring managers and expected to have a positive effect in firm's transparency. I
compute institutional stock ownership (𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) as the fraction of outstanding shares
The only difference between 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 is the definition of “non-managerial” in
condition 3.
13
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held by institutional investors. I also control for the insiders' effect using the fraction
of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder (𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ). Firm's cash
holdings are regarded as important resources for managers to purchase perks and can
worsen agency problem and influence firm's information asymmetry. I thus include
cash holdings scaled by total assets (𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 ).

Other control variables include firm's leverage ( 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) measured by
debt-to-total-assets ratio, firm age (𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ), which is the logarithm of the number of
years since the firm i is firstly listed, managerial ownership (𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ), which is the
fraction of shares held by officers and directors and growth opportunity (𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 )
measured by the logarithm of Tobin's Q. Industry dummies (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 ) are defined
according to CSRC two-digital industry classification.

[Insert Table 2 here]

The definitions of control variables is presented in Appendix 1 and the descriptive
statistics of control variables from 2002 to 2011 is shown in Table 2. The average
logarithm of firm's market capitalization is 19.238 billion. On average, the number of
stock analysts following a firm is about 6. The fraction of stock holdings by
institutional investors and the largest shareholder is 14.4% and 38.9% respectively.
The average cash holding for the listed firms is about 18.7% and firms carry 46.1%
in debt in their capital structure. Firms get listed for about 6 years on average and the
mean value for Tobin' Q is 1.49.
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Chapter 5. Benchmark Regression

5.1 The Split Share Structure Reform and information asymmetry
My main hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, is that the level of information asymmetry of
listed firms declines on average after the Split Share Structure Reform in China. As
different firms completed the reform at different time, I am able to apply the
difference-in-difference (DID) method to identify the effect of the reform
independent from time-specific changes. To conduct my empirical analysis, I adopt
the difference-in-difference regression model as follows:

𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑒 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3)

where 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the probability of informed trading for firm i in year t and 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform in year t. The
coefficient 𝛽1 is the DID coefficient that estimates the sensitivity of PIN to 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 .
I expect 𝛽1 to be negative. Fe controls for firm-fixed effect and industry dummies
(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 ) control for the industry-fixed effects.14 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set of variables to
control for time-varying firm-level characteristics that can affect firm's information
asymmetry according to the prior studies. I cluster all standard errors at the firm level
to correct for the within-firm correlation between the error terms.

[Insert Table 3 here]

The column (1) of Table 3 reports the results of my benchmark regression. The
14

I report regression results with industry-fixed effect and firm-fixed effect seperately.
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coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , -0.0629, is highly significant at the 1% level. The effect is
both statistically and economically significant. Since the average of PIN in 2004 is
0.239, in post-reform period PIN decreases by 26.3% (0.0629/0.239) on average. The
regression results also show that the estimated coefficients on 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are negative and significant in explaining PIN while that on 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is
positive and significant. Therefore, firms that are larger in size, with more
institutional ownership and more matured have lower level of information symmetry.
Meanwhile, as expected, the ownership of the largest shareholders, as a measure of
ownership concentration, increases with PIN. Overall, the benchmark regression
documents a large decline in PIN for listed firms after the Split Share Structure
Reform in China. I also report the benchmark regression result by using firm-fixed
effect instead of industry-fixed effect in column (2) and the results are consistent
with that in column (1).

As agency problems caused by the coexistence of tradable and non-tradable shares
are considered as the source of higher information asymmetry of firms in China, I
examine directly how the percentage of non-tradable shares before the SSSR
influences PIN. I estimate a regression model with PIN as the dependent variable in a
subsample period from 2002 to 2004. The explanatory variables include the
percentage of non-tradable shares and the control variables in the previous regression.
I control for industry fixed effect and year fixed effect. The regression results are
presented in column (3) of Table 3. It is shown that the percentage of non-tradable
shares in 2004 (ntrad) is positive and significant at the 5% level in explaining PIN
before the SSSR. The results demonstrate that prior to the reform firms with more
non-tradable shares tend to have higher information symmetry on average. It affirms
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my conjecture that the existence of non-tradable shares creates agency conflicts and
can lead firms to be more opaque.

5.2 Transparency improvement channels
I then explore the potential channels through which the SSSR improves firm's
transparency. According to the prior literature, the agency costs and stock liquidity
can affect firm's transparency directly. The SSSR eliminates the split share structure
and allows the previous non-tradable shareholders to trade in the secondary market
as tradable shareholders. After the reform, there is a significant reduction in the
incentives divergence among different groups of shareholders. The controlling
shareholders who held non-tradable shares become more concerned with share prices
and will entrench less from the minority shareholders after the reform. A group of
non-managerial blockholders holding non-tradable shares are allowed to sell their
shares freely and thus can monitor firms more effectively through threatening to exit.
Overall, because of better incentive alignment and stronger monitoring effects, I
expect that the agency problem in listed firms is less costly in the post-reform period.
As lower agency costs are associated with lower information asymmetry, the
reduction of agency cost is a channel through which the SSSR leads to the decline in
firm's information asymmetry.

In China, intercorporate loan is the major form of the tunneling activities of
controlling shareholders (Jiang et al. (2010), Liao et al. (2014)). Before the reform,
listed firm lend low-interest corporate loans to their controlling shareholder
companies and many of them are not paid back (Liao et al. (2014)). Following Jiang
et al. (2010), I use other receivables to total assets (otrec) to measure the
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intercorporate loans to controlling shareholders. The higher the otrec, the higher
agency cost between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. To measure
the agency cost between shareholder and manager, I follow Ang et al. (2000) and
Singh et al. (2003) by adopting the expense inefficiency, which is computed as the
ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to operating revenue (𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ).
The higher the 𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 , the higher the agency cost between shareholders and
managers.

The reform also increases stock market liquidity. After the reform, the previous
non-tradable shareholders with about two thirds of shares outstanding are allowed to
participate in the secondary market. Increasing share supplies improves stock market
liquidity and can reduce information symmetry. As documented by Easley et al.
(1996), there is a negative relation between stock liquidity and the probability of
informed trading.

I use the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) (𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ) and the natural logarithm of
yearly share turnover (𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) to measure the liquidity of each stock in each
year. The Amihud illiquidity measure for a day is defined as the absolute value of
daily return divided by the trading volume (dollar) according to Amihud (2002). For
firm i in year t, the annual average Amihud illiquidity measure is calculated as
follows:

𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t =

1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡

𝑑=𝐷

∑d=1 𝑖,𝑡
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|𝑅𝑖,𝑡,𝑑|
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑑

(4)

where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days for which daily data are available for stock i in
year t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 is the return of firm i on day d of year t, and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 is the daily
trading volume in dollar. A higher 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t indicates a lower stock liquidity. The
share turnover (𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) is calculated as the natural logarithm of yearly trading
volume in dollar divided by the average shares outstanding. The stock liquidity of a
firm increases with 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 .

To examine the effects of the SSSR on agency cost and stock liquidity, I estimate the
regression models, with each of 𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐i,t 𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t , and 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , as the
dependent variable. Specifically, the regression models are as follows:

𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑔𝑎i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(5)

where 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform
in year t and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are a set of control variables that are the same as in equation (3).
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The estimated coefficients on
𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t , and 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 are expected to have, respectively, negative,
negative and positive signs.

In column (6) and (7) of Table 3, the estimated coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is negatively
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significant at the 5% level in explaining 𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐i,t . It shows that firm’s
agency cost between controlling shareholders and minority sharheolds and that
between shareholders and managers both declines after the reform. Meanwhile, the
estimate coefficients in column (4) and column (5) are, respectively, positively and
negatively significant, at the 1% level. The results illustrate that the reform improves
stock market liquidity. Therefore, the regression results support Hypothesis 1a and
Hypothesis 1b that the reform reduces information asymmetry because it decreases
agency costs and improves stock market liquidity.
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Chapter 6. Analysis on the trading potential of shares, blockholders’ exit threat,
SOEs versus non-SOEs and trading behaviors of investors

In this section, I conduct more regression analysis to investigate the important factors
that are expected to influence the impact of SSSR on firm's information asymmetry.

6.1 The potential for trading
Despite the fact that all shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the
secondary market after firms complete the SSSR, there still remains a concern that
whether the previous non-tradable shareholders want to reduce their share holdings.
The Chinese government has high incentives to preserve the state's control over
listed firms. So the state-owned shares are unlikely to be frequently traded. The
potential for trading is expected to positively affect the magnitude of the SSSR’s
influences on the incentives alignment and monitoring effect. I predict that the
SSSR’s effect on information asymmetry is more pronounced for the firms whose
previous non-tradable shares have higher potential to be traded after the reform.

To measure the potential for trading, I divide the non-tradable shares of each firm in
2004 into state shares (held by government agencies, SOEs) and legal shares (held by
legal entities, or natural persons). I argue that the state shareholders are less likely to
trade their share actively because of their controlling considerations, while the legal
shares have relatively higher potential to be traded since legal entities, SOEs and
natural persons have incentives to pursue risk-diversification benefits (Li et al.
(2011)). Specifically, I use the percentage of state shares and legal shares of each
firm in 2004 to measure the potential for trading. To empirically test my hypothesis, I
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estimate the following regression models:

𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
+𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(6)

where 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 is the percentage of state-owned non-tradable shares over total shares
outstanding in 2004 and 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the percentage of non-tradable shares owned by
legal entities, SOEs and natural persons over total shares outstanding in 2004. The
terms of 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 and 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 are the key variables of interest.

[Insert Table 4 here]

The regression results are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4. In column (1),
as expected, the estimated coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 is positive and significant
at the 1% level. Therefore, if firms have a higher percentage of non-tradable shares
held by the state, the firm’s information asymmetry decreases less after the reform.
In contrast, in column (2), the estimated coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 is negative
and significant. In both columns, the dummy variable, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , remains highly
significant and negative. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2 that for firms
with higher potential to trade their previous non-tradable shares, the decline in PIN is
larger.
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6.2 The monitoring effect of blockholders' exit threat
In this section, I explore how the blockholders' exit threat can affect the influence of
the reform on information asymmetry of firms. From one aspect, before the reform, it
is almost impossible for the non-managerial blockholders holding non-tradable
shares to exert exit threat on firm’s management because they are not allowed to
“exit” the firms. The SSSR constitutes an exogenous shock that allows blockholders
to sell their shares in the secondary market and thus perform monitoring through exit
threat. As the blockholders’ selling decisions are considered as negative signals to the
market and can cause share prices to decline, firm insiders have the incentives15 to
improve corporate governance and disclose more credible information to the public
with the objective to avoid blockholders from selling their shares. From another
aspect, the SSSR induces an exogenous and positive shock on stock market liquidity,
which is an important condition for blockholders to exert influences via exit threat
according to the theory developed by Edmans (2009). A significant increase in stock
market liquidity can lower the transaction costs of blockholders. Therefore, I
conjecture the exit threat of non-managerial blockholders is an important factor that
influences the reform’s effects on PIN.

According to Edmans (2009), as managers would not threat themselves, the exit
threat can only be exerted by the blockholders who have no management
representation. To conduct my empirical tests, I carefully identify the treatment
group in two ways and construct two indicators, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 , as
described in chapter 4. I capture the effects of blockholders’ exit threat during the

15

I consider both managers and controlling shareholders in Chinese firms as firm insiders. After the
reform, the wealth of the controlling shareholders becomes closely related to the market share price.
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SSSR by an interaction term between 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 (either 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 or 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 ) and
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and investigate if the impact of the reform on PIN is different between the
treatment group and control group. The regression model is specified as follows:

𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
(7)

where 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is either 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 or 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 . The dummy variable, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 ,
equals one if firm i has at least one blockholders who do not take any management
positions as directors and executives and otherwise zero, while 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 , equals
one if firm i has at least one blockholders who do not take any key management
positions including the CEOs, COBs and CFOs and otherwise zero. The regression
controls for industry-fixed effects and the standard error are clustered at the firm
level.

[Insert Table 5 here]

In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, I report the regression results including
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 as explanatory variables respectively. The coefficients
on the interaction terms are significantly negative at 10% and 5% respectively in
columns (1) and (2). In terms of economic significance, for the firms with
non-managerial blockholders before the reform, the reduction in PIN after the reform
is 9.7% (0.0059/0.0611) higher than those without in column (1) and is 11.8%
(0.00699/0.0593) higher in column (2). The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3
that the monitoring role played by non-managerial blockholders through exit threat
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can contribute to the reduction of firm's information asymmetry during the reform.

6.3 SOEs vs non-SOEs
On one hand, the fraction of non-tradable shares in SOEs are much higher than that
in non-SOEs and intuitively the effect of the reform on SOEs should be stronger.
That is, the reduction in information asymmetry should be higher for SOEs. On the
other hand, however, since the ultimate controlling shareholders of SOEs are the
state agencies, the trading potential of previous non-tradable shares in SOEs is
relatively lower than non-SOEs. Moreover, , the exit threat of blockholders in SOEs
is less effective as a monitoring mechanism because the wealth of managers in SOEs
is less tied with stock price (Chen et al. (2013)). Because of the distinction in trading
potential and effectiveness of blockholders’ exit threat, the impacts of the reform on
SOEs may be less pronounced relative to non-SOEs.

To test the two competing hypothesis above, I modify the regression model specified
by equation (3) by adding an interaction between 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 . The
regression model is as follows:

𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(8)

where 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable which equals to one if the ultimate controlling
shareholder for firm i is a state-owned enterprise or government agency and
otherwise zero.
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Column (3) of Table 5 shows the regression results. The estimated coefficient on the
interaction term of 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is positively significant. Therefore, the SOEs
experience a lower reduction in PIN. Economically, the drop of PIN for SOEs is
15.8 % (0.0112/0.0708) smaller than that of non-SOEs during the SSSR. The result
supports the view that the decline in PIN is smaller for SOEs because the trading
potential of state shares is lower and the blockholders' exit threat is less effective in
SOEs. The latter hypothesis dominates the former one.
6.4 The Split Share Structure Reform and investors’ trading behavior
To further examine how the SSSR affects the trading behaviors of informed traders
and uninformed traders, we take advantage of the Easley's (1997) microstructure
model to decompose the measure of PIN into the intensities of informed trading and
uninformed trading. Since the SSSR enables the non-tradable shareholders, most of
whom are considered as firm insiders, to jump into the secondary market, there is a
concern that these insiders will act as informed traders and raise information
asymmetry. However, the reform that removes market frictions and increases market
liquidity can also attract more uninformed traders. The measure of PIN defined by
equation (2) is jointly determined by both the intensities of informed trading and
uninformed trading. I predict that both the intensities of informed trading and
uninformed trading increase after the reform and the magnitude is larger for the latter
than for the former.

Following Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013), I use
𝛼*𝜇 in equation (2) as the proxy of the intensity of informed trading (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ) and
𝜀𝑏 +𝜀𝑠 as the proxy of the intensity of uninformed trading (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ). Since all
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the parameters in the microstructure model are calculated at a daily basis, I scale
them into a 100-second level by dividing 144 (4 trading hours equals to 144
100-seconds) to adapt to the magnitude of PIN and other regressors. I modify the
regression model of equation (3) by replacing the dependent variable with each of
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 . I then use a Chow test to examine if the coefficient on
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 to explain 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is significantly different from that to explain
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 .

[Insert Table 6 here]

The regression results are presented in Table 6. As predicted, the coefficients on
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 are positively significant to explain 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 in both
column (1) and (2). The SSSR increases both the intensities of informed trading and
uninformed trading. The coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 to explain 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 in column
(2) is almost 7 (1.438/0.216) times of that to explain 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 in column (1). The
result of the Chow test in column (3) shows that the difference in estimated
coefficients, 1.222, is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The
regression results confirms Hypothesis 4 and illustrate that both the intensities of
informed trading and uninformed trading increases after the reform while the
magnitude of the rise is much larger for uninformed trading than informed trading.
The results are consistent with my prediction that even the reform enables firm's
insiders to trade in the secondary market, the large shock on liquidity attracts much
more uninformed traders which eventually causes a decline in PIN.
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Chapter 7. Robustness test

7.1 Propensity Score Matching
I adopt the OLS regression methodology in my benchmark regressions, which
restrict the relation between the dependent variable and independent variables to be
linear. I gauge the linearity constraint by adopting the Propensity Score Matching
(PSM) method to re-estimate the difference-in-difference measures. The treatment
group includes the firms that have completed the reform by the end of year t, and the
control group includes those have not completed the reform by the end of year t. For
firm i in the treatment group, I try to identify a group of firms from the control group
that has the closest propensity score to initiate the reform with firm i. Specifically, I
estimate a probit model to predict whether firm i start the reform. Based on the
values of the matching variables, I compute the predicted probability of firm i
starting the reform. For each firm-year observation in the treatment group, I choose
the control observations with the closest propensity score as its matching
observations. Then I compute the average difference between the PIN of the
treatment firm-year observation and the average PIN of a group of matched control
observations. I adopt kernel matching method to identify matched control firms for
each treatment firm. I use firm-specific characteristics in 2004 as the matching
criteria to compute the propensity scores.

[Insert Table 7 here]

In my main results, the variables of 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,2004 , 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖2004 , 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,2004 and
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,2004 are used as the matching criteria. The balancing property of treatment
40

group and control group is presented in Panel A of Table 7. It shows that none of
these properties are significantly different between the treatment and control groups.
I also consider alternative combinations of matching variables to calculate the
average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). The Panel B of Table 7 shows that the
ATTs are all negative and highly significant for different matching variables. The
observations in the treatment group have a lower average PIN than those in the
control group. Using propensity score matching method, my results are robust and
support my conclusion that PIN declines after the reform.

7.2 Quarterly PIN univariate analysis
In my benchmark regression I test the changes of calendar-year PIN around the Split
Share Structure Reform. To estimate the impact of the reform more directly and
eliminate the potential influences of other policy events on PIN, I narrow the window
of the impact of the reform and conduct univariate analysis on the changes of
quarterly PIN closely around the reform. Specifically, I estimate the values of PIN
for each firm using intraday data within one quarter immediately -before the starting
date of the reform and one quarter after the completion date of the reform. Then I
calculate the difference between the mean value of PIN in the pre-reform quarter and
that in the post-reform quarter and conduct a t-test to examine the significance of the
difference. Further, I repeat the analysis by using different numbers of the quarters.
As shown in Table 8, I report the mean values of PIN of 4 quarters before the reform
and after the reform (q1, q2, q3 and q4) respectively. The t-tests of the differences
between pre-reform quarter and post-reform quarter are all positively significant. The
result shows that PIN declines immediately after the completion of the reform and it
complements to the regression analysis in our main test by using yearly PIN.
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7.3 An alternative measure of information asymmetry
I adopt an alternative measure of information asymmetry, the errors of analysts’
earnings forecasts, and test the effects of the reform. The analyst forecast error is
calculated as the bias between analyst forecast earnings per share and actual earnings
per share and measures the accuracy of analyst predictions (Clement et al. (1999)). If
a firm is less transparent with high information asymmetry, the analysts following the
stock cannot obtain sufficient and precise information to forecast the future earnings
accurately. Thus, larger value in forecast error is associated with a higher level of
information asymmetry of the firm. The analyst forecast error is widely used in the
prior literature as a measure of information asymmetry (Horton et al. (2013) and
Xiao (2015)).

For each firm, the analyst forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between
the actual earnings per share and medium forecast earnings per share of all analysts
following the same stock, scaled by the year-end closing stock price. The estimation
equation of 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 for firm i in year t is as follows:

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =

|𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 |
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡

× 100%

(9)

where 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 represents actual earnings per share of firm i in year t.

[Insert Table 9 here]

Figure 3 shows the time series of cross-sectional medium of error. Similar with that
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of PIN, error keeps stable before the reform and decreases significantly after the
reform. I then replicate the regression in benchmark regression model of equation (3)
by replacing the dependent variable with 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 . The results are shown in column
(1) of Table 9. Consistent with the results presented in the previous sections, the
estimated coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is negatively significant in explaining 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 .
Therefore, my conclusions are not altered when a different measure of information
asymmetry is used.

7.4 Placebo test
I further show that the decline in PIN during the SSSR is not due to a downward time
series trend prior to the reform. I define 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 as an indicator that equals 1
for observations after the year 2003, and 0 otherwise. I re-estimate my main
regression of equation (3) for a sub-sample period from 2002 to 2004 and replace
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 . If there is a decreasing trend in PIN that drives my
regression results, I should find a negative coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 before the
SSSR. Therefore, to support my conclusions, I expect that the coefficient on
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 is not negatively significant.

As shown in in column (2) in Table 9, the coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 is positively
significant. Therefore, firm's information asymmetry tends to increase rather than
decrease after year 2003. Thus the results of the benchmark regression are not due to
the downward time trend prior to the reform.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion

This paper examines how the Split Share Structure Reform in China can affect the
level of listed firm’s information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors
measured by the probability of informed trading (PIN). Using a panel data from 2002
to 2011 and difference-in-difference regression model, I find strong evidence that the
level of firm’s information asymmetry decreases after the reform. Since information
asymmetry can affect firm value by negatively impacting the cost of capital, my
study sheds light on the channels through which the Split Share Structure Reform in
China can improve listed firms’ performance and my results can provide some policy
implications for the future privatization in developing countries. Further, I also
identify the reduction in agency cost and improvement in liquidity as the channels
through which the reform impacts firm’s information asymmetry. Specifically, after
the reform the incentives between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
are better aligned and the blockholders can monitor managers better through
threatening to exit. A better incentive effect and stronger monitoring effect can lead
to the decline of agency conflicts within firms. Consequently, the financial and
operating information environment is more transparent after the reform. On the other
hand, by allowing great amount of shares to enter the market the reform causes a
huge shock on stock market liquidity. Stock market liquidity can reduce the
probability of informed trading by attracting much more uninformed traders, which
can also result in a decline in PIN. Hence, the reduction in agency cost and
improvement in stock market liquidity can serve as the channels through which the
reform influences PIN.
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In my further analysis, I show how some important factors related with the reform
can affect the magnitude of the influence of the reform on PIN. I show that the
decline of the level of firm’s information asymmetry is larger for firms with higher
potential for trading their non-tradable shares, for firms experienced the enhancement
in blockholders’ exit threat, and for non-SOEs. Moreover, I show that the reform
cause a rise in both the intensity of informed trading and uninformed trading, but the
increase in the intensity of uninformed trading is much larger than that of informed
trading. My conclusions are robust by using propensity score matching method,
quarterly PIN, an alternative measure for firm’s information asymmetry and placebo
test.
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Appendix 1 Definition of variables

This table presents the definition of all the variables in this paper
variable

definition

after

Equal to 1 if firm i finishes the reform in year t

treaatll

Equal to 1 if a firm has at least one non-managerial blockholder who has no
any representative as the director or officer in 2004

treatkey

Equal to 1 if a firm has at least one non-managerial blockholder who has no
any representative in the key positions (CEOs, COBs and CFOs) in 2004

sga

ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to operating revenue

otrec

Other receivables to total assets

lturnover

the natural logarithm of yearly trading volume in dollar divided by the
average shares outstanding

ntrad

The fraction of nontradable shares

illiq

Amihud illiquidity,

lsize

logarithm of market capitalization

lanalyst

Logarithm of the number of the analysts

inst

The fraction of shares outstanding hold by institutional investors

largest

The fraction of shares outstanding hold by the largest shareholder

cash

Cash holdings scaled by assets

leverage

Debt to total asset ratio

insider

The total fraction of shares hold by officers and directors

lage

Logarithm of the number of years since listed

ltobin

Logarithm of the Tobin' Q

inform

The intensity of informed trading

uninform

The intensity of uninformed trading

error

Analyst forecast error (the absolute value of the difference between the
average forecast EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by year-end stock price)

after2003

Equal to 1 after 2003
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Figures and tables

Figure 1 Year distribution for all firms starting and completing the reform
Figure 1 shows the number and percentage of listed firms starting and completing the reform in each
year. Panel A presents the starting year distribution and Panel B presents the completing year
distribution.
Panel A: starting year distribution
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Panel B: completing year distribution
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Figure 2 Time series of cross-sectional median of PIN
Figure 2 shows the time series of PIN of our sample firms from 2002 to 2012. The median, first
quartile and third quartile value of PIN are graphed using different types of lines.
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Figure 3 Time series of cross-sectional medium of analyst forecast error
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Table 1 Summary statistics of PIN
This table shows the summary statistics of firm-year observations of PIN in each year and the
estimated parameters to compute PIN. PIN is the probability of informed trading. α is the probability
of an information event. δ is the probability of bad news of the information event .μ is the arrival
rate of informed traders and εb and εs are buy and sell orders from uninformed traders respectively.
year

Mean

S.D

25%

Median

75%

N

Panel A : summary statistics of PIN
2002

0.231

0.081

0.187

0.228

0.270

1120

2003

0.308

0.09

0.266

0.319

0.364

1280

2004

0.239

0.079

0.185

0.255

0.296

1394

2005

0.246

0.056

0.215

0.251

0.282

1376

2006

0.228

0.047

0.206

0.229

0.253

1437

2007

0.170

0.047

0.139

0.165

0.196

1584

2008

0.162

0.055

0.125

0.152

0.196

1662

2009

0.144

0.040

0.117

0.141

0.168

1621

2010

0.148

0.047

0.117

0.141

0.174

1870

2011

0.134

0.050

0.102

0.123

0.152

2091

total

0.200

0.081

0.135

0.186

0.252

12545

Panel B : summary statistics of PIN parameters
α

0.309

0.139

0.207

0.302

0.393

15435

δ

0.383

0.344

0.079

0.266

0.677

15435

μ

170.266

110.008

73.756

158.703

261.826

15435

εb

179.817

207.166

19.587

93.440

278.474

15435

εs

182.620

205.232

21.724

99.602

281.329

15435
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Table 2 Summary statistics of control variables
This table presents the summary statistics of control variables. The definitions of the variables can be
referred in the Appendix 1
Variable

Mean

S.D

25%

Median

75%

N

treatall

0.338

0.473

0

0

1

11856

treatkey

0.482

0.500

0

0

1

12946

lsize

19.283

1.248

18.588

19.240

19.976

16558

lanalyst

1.814

1.280

0.693

1.791

2.833

9026

Inst

0.144

0.194

0.005

0.053

0.210

15279

largest

0.389

0.165

0.261

0.369

0.514

14528

cash

0.187

0.158

0.080

0.141

0.245

15699

leverage

0.461

0.203

0.316

0.473

0.613

12624

lage

1.896

0.755

1.610

2.080

2.485

14747

ltobin

0.403

0.519

0.070

0.269

0.602

15490
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Table 3 The Split Share Structure Reform and Information asymmetry
The column (1) in this table reports the results of our benchmark regression models: 𝑃𝐼𝑁I,t ( 𝑠𝑔𝑎I,t , 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞I,t or 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟I,t ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the probability of informed trading for firm i in year t. In column (2), I repeat the regression model in column (1) by using firm-fixed effect insteat of
industry-fixed effect. The column (3) reports the results of the following regression model: 𝑃𝐼𝑁I,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,2004
is the fraction of non-tradable shares of all outstanding shares in 2004. Column (4), (5), (6) and (7) report the following regression modle:
(𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t or 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐I,t is the ratio of other receivables to total assets, 𝑠𝑔𝑎i,t is the ratio of selling,
general and administrative expenses to operating revenue, 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞i,t is the annual Amihud illiquidity, defined as the average ratio of the absolute value of daily return to the
trading volume (dollar) on that day Industry dummies and 𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of yearly trading volume in dollar divided by the average share outstanding.
Industry dummies, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , control for the industry fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for time-varying firm-level characteristics that can affect firm's information asymmetry.
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform in year t. The control variables are: 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of market capitalization), 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
(the logarithm of the number of analysts following firm i in year t), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (fraction of outstanding shares held by institutional investors), 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the fraction of
outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (cash holdings scaled by total assets), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (debt-to-total-assets ratio), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (the total faction of
shares held by officers and directors), 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of years since firm i is firstly listed), 𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of Tobin's Q). Standard errors are
clustered at firm level and t-values are reported below the coefficients.

VARIABLES
after

(1)
pin
-0.0629***
(-32.87)

(2)
pin
-0.0433***
(-18.96)

ntrad
lsize
lanalyst
inst

-0.0128***
(-13.63)
-0.000676
(-0.927)
-0.0417***
(-11.74)

-0.0156***
(-10.13)
-0.00357***
(-4.054)
-0.0405***
(-9.052)

(3)
pin

0.0346**
(2.561)
-0.0164***
(-6.601)
-0.00260
(-0.988)
0.144***
(3.969)
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(4)
illiq
-0.392***
(-6.098)

(5)
lturnover
1.152***
(61.80)

(6)
sga
-0.180**
(-2.038)

(7)
otrec
-0.0397***
(-12.79)

-0.276***
(-7.528)
0.0715***
(3.506)
-0.524***
(-2.595)

-0.0129
(-1.083)
-0.0205**
(-2.313)
-1.355***
(-25.50)

-0.0733**
(-2.071)
0.0110
(0.677)
0.0541
(0.266)

-0.0153***
(-7.584)
0.00184*
(1.781)
-0.0380***
(-7.693)

largest

0.0273***
(5.867)
cash
0.00873
(1.203)
leverage
-0.00473
(-1.157)
insider
-0.0110
(-0.887)
lage
-0.0201***
(-11.50)
ltobin
2.72e-06
(0.00155)
Constant
0.513***
(28.66)
Industry Fixed Effect YES
Firm-Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
9,425
R-squared
0.409

0.0627***
(6.532)
-0.0115
(-1.191)
0.00616
(0.884)
-0.0129
(-0.345)
-0.0384***
(-11.77)
0.00246
(1.005)
0.585***
(20.89)

-0.0101
(-1.093)
0.0227
(1.571)
0.00699
(0.860)
-0.00359
(-0.158)
-0.000462
(-0.178)
0.0231***
(2.778)
0.508***
(10.09)
YES

0.355***
(3.160)
-0.189
(-0.465)
0.203
(1.613)
-0.154
(-1.063)
0.0707*
(1.931)
0.419**
(2.403)
5.461***
(8.707)
YES

-0.147***
(-2.694)
-0.262***
(-3.047)
0.373***
(7.693)
-0.151
(-1.018)
-0.0621***
(-3.941)
0.295***
(9.267)
1.253***
(5.612)
YES

-0.207
(-0.898)
-0.325**
(-2.166)
0.00487
(0.0240)
0.0433
(0.335)
0.0638**
(2.229)
0.280**
(2.060)
1.619***
(3.034)
YES

-0.0164*
(-1.656)
-0.0755***
(-7.298)
0.0539***
(5.890)
-0.0206
(-1.446)
0.00927***
(4.163)
0.0289***
(5.857)
0.342***
(9.221)
YES

YES
3,569
0.168

9,529
0.033

9,529
0.453

9,355
0.005

9,529
0.183

YES
9,425
0.447
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Table 4 The potential for trading and information asymmetry
In this table, Column (1) and (2) reports the results of the following regression model: 𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
and
𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
respectively.
Industry
dummies, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , control for the industry fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for time-varying
firm-level characteristics that can affect firm's information asymmetry. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable
which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform in year t. The control variables are: 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the
logarithm of market capitalization), 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of analysts following
firm i in year t), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (fraction of outstanding shares held by institutional investors), 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
(the fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (cash holdings scaled by
total assets), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (is measured as debt-to-total-assets ratio), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (the total faction of
shares held by officers and directors), 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of years since firm i is
firstly listed), 𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of Tobin's Q). Standard errors are clustered at firm level and
t-values are reported below the coefficients.

VARIABLES
state_after
state

(1)
pin
0.0377***
(5.074)
-0.0405***
(-5.270)

legal_after
legal
after
lsize
lanalyst
inst
largest
cash
leverage
insider
lage
ltobin
Constant
Industry fixed effect
Observations
R-squared

-0.0768***
(-20.70)
-0.0119***
(-11.07)
-0.00160**
(-1.997)
-0.0423***
(-10.73)
0.0449***
(7.243)
0.00431
(0.510)
-0.00952**
(-2.041)
0.0213
(1.179)
-0.0190***
(-9.476)
0.00258
(1.270)
0.503***
(24.47)
YES
7,302
0.407
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(2)
pin

-0.0190***
(-2.684)
0.0233***
(3.481)
-0.0598***
(-19.45)
-0.0122***
(-10.54)
-0.000507
(-0.596)
-0.0446***
(-10.40)
0.0258***
(4.472)
0.00402
(0.481)
-0.00273
(-0.625)
-0.0162
(-1.199)
-0.0203***
(-10.31)
-0.000463
(-0.228)
0.496***
(22.65)
YES
7,235
0.420

Table 5 Blockholder exit threat and information asymmetry
This table reports the results of the following regression models: 𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , 𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖𝑛i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the probability of informed trading for firm i in year t. Treatall and
treatkey are described in section 2 in detail. Industry dummies, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , control for the industry
fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for time-varying firm-level characteristics that can affect firm's
information asymmetry. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform
in year t. The control variables are: 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of market capitalization), 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the
logarithm of the number of analysts following firm i in year t), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (fraction of outstanding shares
held by institutional investors), 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest
shareholder), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (cash holdings scaled by total assets), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (is measured as
debt-to-total-assets ratio), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (the total faction of shares held by officers and directors),
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of years since firm i is firstly listed), 𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of
Tobin's Q). Standard errors are clustered at firm level and t-values are reported below the coefficients.

VARIABLES
treatall_after
treatall

(1)
PIN
-0.00590*
(-1.839)
0.00858***
(2.775)

(2)
PIN

treatkey_after

-0.00699**
(-2.280)
0.0108***
(3.590)

treatkey
after_soe
soe
after
lsize
lanalyst
inst
largest
cash
leverage
insider
lage
ltobin

Constant

(3)
PIN

-0.0611***
(-25.66)
-0.0123***
(-11.87)
-0.000918
(-1.185)
-0.0418***
(-11.23)
0.0318***
(6.132)
0.0112
(1.461)
-0.00448
(-1.035)
-0.0150
(-1.189)
-0.0198***
(-10.79)
0.000102
(0.0533)

-0.0593***
(-24.09)
-0.0126***
(-13.23)
-0.000552
(-0.750)
-0.0413***
(-11.50)
0.0352***
(6.825)
0.00821
(1.113)
-0.00589
(-1.414)
-0.00992
(-0.809)
-0.0201***
(-11.27)
-0.000244
(-0.135)

0.493***
(25.08)

0.502***
(27.27)
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0.0112***
(3.306)
-0.00913***
(-2.816)
-0.0708***
(-22.77)
-0.0127***
(-13.49)
-0.000734
(-1.006)
-0.0421***
(-11.78)
0.0292***
(6.153)
0.00853
(1.179)
-0.00533
(-1.304)
-0.0100
(-0.771)
-0.0203***
(-11.56)
0.000162
(0.0918)
(-2.816)
0.518***
(28.96)

Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R-squared

YES
8,329
0.409

YES
9,174
0.410
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YES
9,413
0.410

Table 6 The Split Share Structure Reform and trading behavior
In this table, column (1) and column (2) report the results of the following regression models: 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the intensity of informed trading for firm i in year t. 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the intensity of uninformed trading for firm i
in year t. Column (3) reports the Chow-test on the difference in the coefficient on 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 between column (1) and column (2). Chi-square statistic and p-value are reported
below the absolute value of the difference. Industry dummies, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , control for the industry fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for time-varying firm-level characteristics
that can affect firm's information asymmetry. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform in year t. The control variables are: 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the
logarithm of market capitalization), 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of analysts following firm i in year t), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (fraction of outstanding shares held by
institutional investors), 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (cash holdings scaled by total assets), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (is
measured as debt-to-total-assets ratio), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (the total faction of shares held by officers and directors), 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of years since firm i is
firstly listed), 𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of Tobin's Q). Standard errors are clustered at firm level and t-values are reported below the coefficients.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
inform
uninform
Difference
inform
uninform
Difference
after
0.216***
1.438***
1.222***
0.0922***
0.598***
0.506***
(26.68)
(25.77)
Chi2=632.38
(9.453)
(8.756)
Chi2=698.10
lsize
0.198***
1.376***
P=0
0.248***
1.709***
P=0
(29.02)
(29.32)
(26.49)
(25.36)
lanalyst
-0.00999**
0.0303
0.0114**
0.209***
(-2.003)
(0.819)
(2.240)
(5.537)
inst
-0.0204
0.410**
-0.0625**
0.390**
(-0.726)
(2.058)
(-2.222)
(2.019)
largest
-0.341***
-2.550***
-0.642***
-4.507***
(-13.63)
(-14.08)
(-11.60)
(-11.41)
cash
-0.0814*
-0.499*
0.0324
0.467
(-1.958)
(-1.735)
(0.662)
(1.367)
leverage
0.103***
0.705***
0.0691**
0.416*
(4.576)
(4.291)
(2.004)
(1.692)
insider
-0.188**
-0.989*
0.0427
0.125
(-2.357)
(-1.883)
(0.208)
(0.0805)
lage
0.0756***
0.624***
0.147***
1.095***
(10.14)
(12.41)
(11.67)
(12.54)
57

ltobin
Constant
Industry-fixed effect
Firm-fixed effect
Observations
R-squared

0.0595***
(4.602)
-3.508***
(-27.56)
YES

0.191**
(2.103)
-25.01***
(-28.51)
YES

0.0510***
(3.190)
-4.537***
(-25.45)

-0.0336
(-0.299)
-31.91***
(-24.64)

9,425
0.510

9,425
0.573

9,425
0.543

9,425
0.611
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Table 7 Propensity Score Matching
This table reports the test results with Propensity Score Matching method. Panel A shows the
balancing property between treatment group and control group after matching by using lsize lanalyst
inst and largest. Panel B reports the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT) by using different
matching variables. We adopt the Probit model to calculate the propensity score and use kernel
matching method to identify matched control firm-year observations for each observation in the
treatment group. All the matching variables are valued in 2004. The t-values are reported below the
ATT.
Panel A:
variable
lsize
lanalyst
inst
largest

Balancing property after matching
Mean
treated
control
19.548
19.55
0.735
0.719
1.075
1.072
0.466
0.460

bias
-0.3
2.1
0.6
3.3

t-statistics
-0.07
0.64
0.23
1.00

Panel B: Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT) Using Different Matching Variables
Matching Variables
ATT
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest
-0.0916***
(-26.63)
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest, cash
-0.0915***
(-35.52)
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest, cash, leverage
-0.0933***
(-35.06)
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest, cash, leverage, insider
-0.0933***
-31.38
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest, cash, leverage, insider, lage
-0.0969***
(-29.21)
lsize, lanalyst, inst, largest, cash, leverage, insider, lage, ltobin
-0.0954***
(-30.67)
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Table 8 univariate analysis of changes in quarterly PIN
This table reports univariate analysis of changes in quarterly PIN around the reform. q1, q2, q3 and q4
refers to the number of quarters before or after the completion date of the reform. I report the mean
value of PIN of different number of quarters that are used to estimate PIN. The difference of the PIN
between pre-reform quarter and post-reform quarter is shown in the last column and the t-statistic of
the difference is reported in the parenthesis.

Pre-reform
Quarter
Mean(pin)
q1
0.223
q2
0.231
q3
0.241
q4
0.239

Post-reform
Quarter
Mean(pin)
q1
0.199
q2
0.201
q3
0.204
q4
0.181
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diff-in-mean
0.004*** (4.5265)
0.03*** (6.215)
0.043*** (8.915)
0.059*** (16.131)

Table 9 An Alternative measure of information asymmetry and Placebo test
The column (1) in this table reports the results of the regression model: 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟i,t is absolute value of the difference between the actual
earnings per share (EPS) and medium forecast earnings per share of all analysts following the same
stock scaled by the year-end closing stock price. Column (2) reports the following regression model
for the time period from 2002 to 2004: 𝑃𝐼𝑁i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2003𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator that equals 1 for observations after the year 2003, and 0 otherwise
Industry dummies, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 , control for the industry fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for
time-varying firm-level characteristics that can affect firm's information asymmetry. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a
dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i finished the reform in year t. The control variables are:
𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of market capitalization), 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of analysts
following firm i in year t), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (fraction of outstanding shares held by institutional investors),
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (cash holdings
scaled by total assets), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (is measured as debt-to-total-assets ratio), 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (the total
faction of shares held by officers and directors), 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of the number of years since
firm i is firstly listed), 𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (the logarithm of Tobin's Q). Standard errors are clustered at firm
level and t-values are reported below the coefficients.

VARIABLES
after

(1)
error
-0.00731***
(-3.421)

after2003
lsize
lanalyst
inst
largest
cash
leverage
insider
lage
ltobin
Constant
Industry Fixed Effect
obeservations
R-squared

-0.00846***
(-7.989)
0.00331***
(4.503)
-0.00920*
(-1.896)
0.00365
(0.654)
-0.00239
(-0.331)
0.0260***
(4.017)
0.0143
(1.204)
0.000453
(0.338)
-0.0291***
(-10.87)
0.205***
(10.82)
YES
5,869
0.150
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(2)
pin

0.0388***
(10.83)
-0.0274***
(-9.006)
0.00327
(0.626)
0.243***
(5.471)
0.00411
(0.391)
0.0243
(1.290)
-0.00244
(-0.239)
0.0179
(0.395)
0.00258
(0.796)
-0.00364
(-0.378)
0.733***
(12.56)
YES
2,595
0.080
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